Loyola University Chicago, School of Law

LAW eCommons
Faculty Publications & Other Works

2008

Hearing But Not Listening: Comparative
Competition Law and the DOJ Monopoly Report
Spencer Weber Waller
Loyola University Chicago, swalle1@luc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Waller, Spencer Weber, Hearing But Not Listening: Comparative Competition Law and the DOJ Monopoly Report, Global
Competition Policy (Oct. 2008), available at www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications & Other Works
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

OCTOBER 2008, RELEASE ONE

Hearing But Not Listening:
Comparative Competition Law
and the DOJ Monopoly Report

Spencer Weber Waller
Loyola University Chicago School of Law

WWW.GLOBALCOMPETITIONPOLICY.ORG
Competition Policy International, Inc. © 2008. Copying, reprinting, or distributing this article is forbidden by anyone other than the publisher or author.

RELEASE: SEP-08 (2)

Hearing But Not Listening: Comparative Competition Law and the
DOJ Monopoly Report
Spencer Weber Waller*

he Department of Justice (“DOJ”) monopoly report1 is enormously disappointing
for a number of reasons. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) was wise to
participate in this important project, but equally wise to distance itself from the final
work product. The final report represents a serious effort, but reads in too many places
like a justification for a record of inaction by the DOJ and an attempt to lock in future
administrations to a similar course. I suspect that the report will achieve neither of these
goals and hope that the DOJ’s Antitrust Division of the next administration rejoins the
FTC in bringing both innovative and traditional monopolization investigations and cases
where appropriate.2
Many critics (including the majority of the FTC commissioners) have pointed out
the substantive shortcomings of the report. I would like to focus instead on the missed
opportunity of the report to study, and take seriously, the substantive law on the abuse of
a dominant position that exists in the many jurisdictions outside the United States. The
hearing featured a number of witnesses from outside the United States, although the
*Spencer Weber Waller is Professor and Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at
Loyola University Chicago School of Law
1

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF
THE SHERMAN ACT 129 (2008).
2

For a very different take on an appropriate monopolization policy for the United States going
forward see AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA 55-94 (2008), available at
http://antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/transitionreport.ashx.
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majority of them participated only in the hearings on so-called “international issues.” In
addition, other witnesses from the United States made reference to developments from
outside the United States. But the question remains whether anyone was listening, and
how the DOJ could have taken advantage of these comparative perspectives from an
increasingly multipolar competition world and incorporated them into the final report.
Outside the international perspectives chapter, there are few references to the laws
or decisions of foreign jurisdictions, even though the DOJ acknowledges that global
companies are subject to an increasing array of differing rules concerning the very
conduct discussed in the report. Even the international chapter too often reflects the
attitude that the U.S. approach is necessarily best and any jurisdiction that acts differently
needs to harmonize their law more in accordance with the report’s recommendations.
The reality is that the European Community, far more than the United States, has
provided the model for the rest of the world for rules governing the behavior of dominant
firms and the report fails to incorporate any of that learning. We are not exactly alone, but
the highly lenient rules recommended by the report for predatory pricing, tying, bundling,
technology licensing, and refusals to deal hardly reflects the majority position that most
global companies have to deal with on a daily basis.
One example of this failing can be seen in the report’s treatment of refusals to
deal and the essential facilities doctrine. The report is unrelenting in its criticism of
imposing any duty to deal on a dominant firm lest pro-competitive behavior and
innovation be chilled by incumbents and other firms. The report concludes that “the
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essential-facilities doctrine is a flawed means of deciding whether a unilateral,
unconditional refusal to deal harms competition,” and “that antitrust liability for
unconditional refusals to deal with rivals should not play a meaningful part in Section 2
enforcement.”3 The same suspicion of the need for non-discriminatory access to
infrastructure, networks, and platform technologies under certain carefully limited
circumstances as a tool of competition policy is reiterated in the later chapter on
remedies.4
A closer look at this issue reveals several significant problems which are a
microcosm of the flaws of the report as a whole. The witnesses and literature discussed in
this section are a small subset of the vast commentary on the essential facilities doctrine
and refusals to deal which reflects a far greater diversity of views that the report
acknowledges. The U.S. case law is quoted selectively and misleadingly, with two of the
three quotes from the 1919 Colgate case omitting the crucial qualifier that there is no
general duty to deal “in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly.”5
Concerns about harm to efficiency and innovation are many, but are nothing more than
vague and undocumented rhetoric. References to harm to competition through the denial
of access to bottleneck monopolies and infrastructure are few and far between.
The chapter, like most of the rest of the report, would also have benefited from an
analysis of what the rest of the world is doing with respect to this issue. No foreign
witnesses were heard on this issue and comparative law does not appear to have been a
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Supra note 1 at 129.
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Id. at 143-59.

5

United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).

4

WWW.GLOBALCOMPETITIONPOLICY.ORG
Competition Policy International, Inc. © 2008. Copying, reprinting, or distributing this article is forbidden by anyone other than the publisher or author.

RELEASE: SEP-08 (2)

significant part of the testimony or literature considered in the report. A more
comprehensive and cosmopolitan look at the essential facilities doctrine and related open
access requirements would have revealed that these doctrines are alive and well
throughout foreign competition law and for the most part have been applied in a sensible,
limited, and pro-competitive fashion.6
In addition to the EC which has a substantial line of decisions and judgments in
this area, such diverse jurisdictions as the U.K., Israel, Ireland, New Zealand, Germany,
the World Trade Organization, and other national and regional competition bodies have
recognized the obligation of dominant firms to provide non-discriminatory access to their
facilities under different limiting principles. It is the United States, and not the rest of the
world that is increasingly out of step on this issue and the report represents a missed
opportunity to take advantage of a world of experience on this issue.
Current events suggest that continuing a position of parochialism and
exceptionalism for the United States on issues of market fundamentalism is rapidly
becoming a thing of the past. While there is much to admire in the hard work and serious
research displayed in the DOJ monopolization report, it is ironic that it appeared just
weeks before an unadulterated faith in unregulated markets as best serving the needs of
consumers and society came crashing down on a much broader scale. Ultimately,
however, the shortcomings of the report, and not just its timing, suggest a short shelf life
and little impact regardless of the next administration in Washington.

6

A more favorable economic view of the essential facilities doctrine based on the need for access to a
narrowly defined notion of infrastructure is set forth in Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller,
Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2008); Spencer Weber Waller, Areeda, Epithets,
and Essential Facilities, 2008 WISC. L. REV. 360 (analyzing both US and EU developments).
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